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ESSAY

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, MICROCOMPUTERS, AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Stuart S. Nagel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of systems analysis and microcomputers can be of great
assistance in understanding and improving the efficiency of judicial decision-making and judicial administration. In this context, systems
analysis processes the goals to be achieved, the alternatives available
for achieving the goals, and the relationships between the goals and the
alternatives. The objective of systems analysis is to find the most appropriate alternative, or combination of alternatives, necessary to achieve
the desired goals. Consequently, systems analysis can develop a rule to
predict the outcome of a particular case or to explain the behavior of a
court in any given case. Due to the numerous combinations of alternatives, microcomputers are essential to processing the goals, alternatives,
and relations.
When considering systems analysis and microcomputers, the judicial process can be divided into two parts. The first part concerns judicial decision-making. Systems analysis can predict judicial decisions in
light of past decisions and can prescribe policy and trial decisions in
light of the goals to be achieved. The second part of the judicial process
concerns judicial administration. Systems analysis and microcomputers
can assist in orderly judicial administration by assigning judges to particular types of cases, by efficiently sequencing cases and by allocating
cases to alternative methods of dispute resolution. In short, systems
analysis can develop procedures to improve the effectiveness, efficiency
and equity of the judicial process.
The microcomputer software described in this article is generally
J.D., Northwestern University (1958); Ph.D., Northwestern University (1961). Professor
of Political Science at the University of Illinois and member of the Illinois bar. Former attorney
for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, the Legal Services Corporation, and the National Labor
Relations Board. Instructor for the Committee on Continuing Professional Education of the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association.
*
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categorized as multi-criteria decision-making software (MCDMS). The
particular software package used to generate the materials contained in
this article is known as Policy/Goal Percentaging (P/G%). This
software package, as indicated by its name, relates policies or decisions
to goals or criteria, and utilizes part/whole percentaging to measure
goals in different ways.'

II.

JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: PREDICTING DECISIONS IN LIGHT
OF PAST DECISIONS AND PRESENT FACTS

There are three common techniques that are relevant to predicting
judicial decisions that lend themselves to systems analysis. These techniques correspond to the briefing of individual appellate cases, to synthesizing sets of cases, and to fact-finding at the trial court level.
A.

Using MCDMS to Brief Appellate Cases

An instructive example of how P/G % software is used to brief an
appellate case may be found in the analysis of the United States Supreme Court decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. Table 1 reveals
the analysis of the Rodriguez decision as generated by the P/G%
software.
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit on behalf of
members of minority groups and the poor who resided in the Texas
school districts that had a low property tax base.' The suit attacked the
system of financing used to allocate funds to the state's public elementary and secondary schools.' The plaintiffs alleged that Texas' reliance
on local property taxes to finance schools favored the more affluent and,
therefore, violated the equal protection clause.5 The plaintiffs argued
that substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulted primarily from differences in the value of assessable property in
the districts. 6 The United States Supreme Court, finding that the disparities in per-pupil expenditures were not the result of invidious discrimination, held that the Texas system of school funding did not viol. See generally S. NAGEL, DECISION-AIDING SOFTWARE AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
(1989); S. NAGEL, MICROCOMPUTERS AS DECISON AIDS IN LAW PRACTICE (1987) (presenting
general backround information on multi-criteria decision-making applied during the legal process); S. NAGEL, EVALUATION ANALYSIS WITH MICROCOMPUTERS (1989) (presenting a general
discussion on the methodology employed with multi-criteria decision-making).
2. 411 U.S. I (1973).
3. Id.at 4-5.
4. Id. at I.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
6. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
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TABLE I. BRIEFING AN APPELLATE CASE: SAN ANTONIO v. RODRIGUEZ

A. ALTERNATIVES AND CRITERIA
Previous
Criterion
Outcome

Alternative
I
2
3
4
5

I
2
3
4
5
6

YES
NO
NO
NO
?

NO EQUALITY REQD.
= $ PER STUDENT
MIN. $ PER STUDENT
HIGH $ PER STUDENT
OTHER

Meas. Unit

Weight

1-3

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

EDUCATED POP.
-DISCONTENT
-DOWNGRADING
ADMIN. EASE
CONSIST:"W/CASES
-EXPENSE

B. SCORES OF THE ALTERNATIVES ON THE CRITERIA
EDUCATED -DISCON -DOWNGR ADMIN.EA CONSIST. -EXPENSE
NO EQUALITY REQD.
= $ PER STUDENT
MIN. $ PER STUDENT
HIGH $ PER STUDENT

1.00
2.00
2.00
3.00

3.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

3.00
1.00
2.00
2.00

1.00
2.00
2.00
3.00

2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00

3.00
2.00
1.50
1.00

C. TOTAL SCORES OF THE ALTERNATIVES

Alternative

Combined
Raw Scores

Previous
Outcome

13.00
10.00
10.50
11.00

YES
NO
NO
NO

NO EQUALITY REQD.
= S PER STUDENT
MIN. S PER STUDENT
HIGH S PER STUDENT

D. CHANGES NECESSARY TO ELEVATE THE SECOND PLACE
ALTERNATIVE TO FIRST PLACE

EDUCATED POP.
-DISCONTENT
-DOWNGRADING
ADMIN. EASE
CONSIST. W/CASES
-EXPENSE
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NO EQUALITY

MIN. S PER

Weight

-1.50
-1.50
0.50
0.50
-0.50
0.50

4.50
4.50
4.50
3.50
4.50
4.00

3.500
3.500
-1.500
-0.250
?
-0.667
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late the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
The first part of the brief contained in section A of Table 1 indicates that the Court was faced with four alternative decisions in Rodriguez. The Court could have found that no equality in per-pupil expenditures is required by the equal protection clause; that equal
expenditures per-pupil is constitutionally mandated; that a minimum
amount of expenditures per-pupil is required; or that per-pupil expenditures must be equivalent across the board, but at a level higher than
some minimal amount of expenditures. Section A of the brief detailed
in Table I demonstrates that the Court found the no equality alternative to be the most sound position.8
The second section of the brief contained in Table 1, section A,
demonstrates that there were six relevant criteria for the Rodriguez
Court to consider in deciding the case. The criteria include: (1) the
desire for having an educated population; (2) the need for decreasing
the discontent among parents and students due to educational opportunity disparities; (3) the prospect of reducing the quality of education
available in affluent areas resulting from forced equalization of perpupil expenditures; (4) the promotion of administrative ease and efficiency; (5) the consistency of a decision with prior case law; and (6)
the desire to avoid a heavy expense to the taxpayer.
The third section of the brief indicated in Table 1, section B, is
devoted to demonstrating how each alternative scored on each of the
six criteria. The alternatives were scored using a simple 1-3 scale. A
score of 3 is the equivalent of an alternative that is conducive to the
goal; a score of 2 indicates an alternative neither conducive nor adverse
to the achievement of the goal; a score of 1 is the equivalent of an
alternative adverse to the stated goal.
The fourth section of the brief contained in Table 1, section C,
reveals the combined raw scores for each alternative using the apparent
scoring of the Supreme Court. The alternative with the highest combined raw score would predict the alternative that the United States
Supreme Court ultimately adopted, namely that the equal protection
clause does not require that per-pupil expenditures be equal across the
state.
The final part of the brief contained in Table 1, section D, is the
threshold analysis of the Rodriguez case. The program determined that
the first place alternative was the "no equity" alternative, and the second place alternative was the "minimum dollar per student" alternative. Furthermore, the analysis indicates the factors that would be nec-

7. Id. at 55.
8. Id.
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essary to increase the second place alternative to the most optimal
alternative for the Court. There was a gap of 2.50 points between the
first and second place alternatives' combined raw scores. That disparity
in points would be eliminated if the "no equality" alternative were to
drop by 2.50 points on any of the six criteria. Such a decrease in points,
however, would not be possible because the lowest score available on
any one criterion is 1.00. The disparity in points could also be eliminated if the second place alternative, having a "minimum number of
dollars per student," were to increase by 2.50 points on any of the six
criteria. Again, such an increase is inconceivable since the highest score
available on any one criterion is 3.00."
The gap, however, could feasibly be eliminated if the United
States Supreme Court were to place substantially more weight on having an educated population or on decreasing discontent among students
and parents due to educational inequities. The two foregoing criteria
are considerations that advocates of a minimum dollars position would
emphasize because it would raise the score of that alternative. The disparity in combined raw scores would also be eliminated if the other
criteria were given negative weights, but such a situation is unlikely.
Changing the weight given would not assist in achieving the desired
consistency with prior case law, since both alternatives scored the same
on that criterion.
B.

Using MCDMS To Synthesize Sets of Appellate Cases

An example of synthesizing a set of appellate cases utilizing
P/G % software is revealed in Table 2. The line of appellate cases consists of nine decisions concerning legislative redistricting, beginning
with the 1948 decision in Colegrove v. Green1 ° and concluding with
Baker v. Carr," which was in decided 1962.12 Each of the nine selected
cases is scored with a 2 for a positive answer and a 1 for a negative

9. The following sources provide the reader with a general discussion,of systematic case
briefing: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (W. Thode ed. 1970);
LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS (H. Jones ed. 1980); W. STATSKY & J. WERNET,
CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977).
10. 328 U.S. 549 (1948).
II. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. These nine cases are: Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1948); W.M.C.A.
v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn.
1958); Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1956), rev'd, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958); Grills
v. Anderson, 29 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Ind. 1961); Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63
(1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 429 (1962); Asbury Park Press v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705
(1960).
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TABLE 2. SYNTHESIZING A SET OF APPELLATE CASES
CRITERIA

Equality
Requirement

CASES

State/Federal
Legislature

Disparity
significance

Fedal/State
Court

SUm
(Weightd)

OUTCOME
Winner

2

AWARD
(Dolls.)

I

W - I (or2)

W - I

Colegrove

1 (2)

1I

5 (6)

D

0

Grills

2 (4)

2

1

I

6 (8)

A

2

Maryland

1 (2)

2

2

I

6 (7)

D

0

Schol,

1 (2)

2

2

I

6 (7)

D

0

WMCA

1 (2)

2

I

2

6 (7)

D

0

Asbury

2 (4)

2

2

I

7 (9)

A

6

Dyer

2 (4)

I

2

2

7 (9)

A

8

Bakr

2 (4)

2

2

2

8(10)

A

9

Magraw

2 (4)

2

2

2

8(10)

A

10

W - I

W -

NOTES:
1. In columns 1-4, I means "no" and 2 means "yes". An "A"in the outcome column means the
attacker wins. A "D" means the defender wins.
2. The decision rule which the above data initially generates is:
(1) If a redistricting case during the time period covered has a summation score of 7 or above,
the attacker wins.
(2) If a summation score is 6 or below, the defender wins.
3. This decision rule generates one inconsistent case, Grills. The inconsistency can be eliminated
by the following possible changes:
(1) Changing the decision rule such that a summation score of 6 provides an unclear outcome.
(2) Giving the first variable a weight of 2, which would be consistent with the importance of
requiring equality.
(3) Adding a fifth variable called "Decided After the Maryland Case."
(4) Eliminating the Grills case, which does not seem justifiable.
(5) Changing the measurement on the first variable from no/yes to a 1-3 scale and give Grills
a score of 3.
(6) Finding that Grills really deserves a relation score of 2 on the third and fourth variables.
4. Each predicted criterion is initially given an equal weight of 1.If the equality requirement is
then given a weight of 2, due to its substantive importance, the Grills case would no longer be
an inconsistently low-scoring case which the attacker won. The new predictive decision rule
would be:
(1)If a redistricting case has a weighted summation score of 8 or above, the attacker wins.
(2) Ifthe weighted summation score is 7 or below, the attacker loses.
5.The dollar amounts in the last column represent hypothetical data showing how many
thousands of dollars the successful attacker received in the form of damages. This information
is useful for illustrating how the methodology predicts a continuum outcome as contrasted to a
dichotomous outcome of winning versus losing.
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answer on each of the four predictive criteria. The four criteria include:
(1) whether equality in population among districts is explicitly required
by the relevant federal or state constitution; (2) whether a state or federal legislature is involved in the redistricting; (3) whether the degree
of disparity among districts is significant; and (4) whether a federal or
state court is reviewing the redistricting.
The fifth column reveals the sum of the raw scores in each case.
The sixth column in Table 2 indicates how each case was decided in
terms of whether the party that prevailed in the litigation was the defender, D, or the attacker, A, of the existing redistricting system. The
data available in Table 2 leads to a decisional rule in which the attacker of the redistricting system prevails when the total raw score is 7
or above. However, if the total raw score is 6 or below, then the defender of the system prevails in court. This decisional rule, however, is
not necessarily consistent with the data in Table 2. For example, in
Grills v. Anderson," the total raw score was 6, but the attacker of the
redistricting system still prevailed.
The notes following Table 2 reveal that inconsistencies, such as
that found in the Grills score, can be eliminated by engaging in a variety of legitimate manuevers. The most meaningful approach to eliminating any inconsistencies is to give the predictive criteria different
weights to indicate their relative importance. In this context, the most
important criteria are the first criterion, concerning the nature of the
law, and the third criterion, which deals with the key facts. Giving the
equality requirement a weight of 2 will double all the numbers in the
first column, which changes the summation scores (results indicated in
parentheticals). The new weighted summation scores now lead to a decisional rule that states if the total raw score is eight or above, then the
attacker of the redistricting system prevails; if the total raw score is
seven or below, the defender prevails. This new decisional rule reveals
no inconsistencies. The cases used as a model have thus been synthesized into a meaningful decisional rule. 4
C. Using MCDMS to Synthesize Facts in Trial Decisions
An example of synthesizing a set of facts in a trial decision using
the P/G % software is provided in Table 3. The facts utilized to generate the data in Table 3 are from a criminal case in which the primary

13. 29 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Ind. 1961).
14. See generally Nagel, Using Microcomputers and P/G% to Predict Court Cases, 18 AKRON L. REv. 541 (1985) (setting forth general backround material on applying multi-criteria decision-making to synthesizing sets of appellate cases).
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TABLE 3. SYNTHESIZING TRIAL FACTS: A CRIMINAL CASE
CRITERIA

ALTERNATIVES

(I)
DefenseStatement
(Alibi)
W -2

(2)
Proseution
Statement
(Scme of Crime)
W - I

(3)
SUM

(4)
SUM
N

(5)
Weighted Sum

(I)+(2)

(3)/2

(I.5)+(2)

(6)
Weighted Sum
Sum of Weights
(5)/3

Defendant is
Guilty

.20

( .40)

,70

.90

.45

1.10

.37

Defendantis not
Guilty

80 (1.60)
,.00 (200)

.30
1.00

1.10
2.00

.55
1.00

1.90
3.00

.63
.00

NOTES:
I. The numbers in columns I and 2 are probabilities. They indicate the degree of accuracy or
truth associated with.the statements in the direction of establishing the defendant's guilt. Thus,
the .20 probability means that there is a .80 probability that the defense statement is true, and
the .20 complement is in the direction of establishing the defendant's guilt. These are probabilities of truth, not probabilities of guilt.
2. The weights indicate the degree of importance of the evidence items. Thus an alibi statement is
quite important (if true) in establishing innocence. A statement saying the defendant was at
the scene of the crime is less important because it does not necessarily establish the defendant's
guilt. The numbers in parentheses in column I are weighted probabilities.
3. The numbers in column 3 are the sum of the two unweighted probabilities. The numbers in
column 5 are the sums of the two weighted probabilities.
4. The numbers in column 4 are the average of the unweighted probabilities. The numbers in
column 5 are the average of the weighted probabilities. The numbers in column 6 are an approximation of Bayesian conditional probabilities especially when one is only working with
probabilities of truthfulness and degrees of importance.
5. If the probability in the upper right hand corner is greater than .90, then the judge, juror, or
other perceiver of these two items of evidence should vote to convict assuming: (1) .90 is accepted as the threshold probability interpretation of beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) these
are the only items of evidence. Conversely, if the probability in the upper right hand corner is
.90 or less, then one should vote to acquit.
6. If there are two alibi witnesses, each might receive a weight of 1.5. If there is one alibi witness
a weight of 2 is received. They do not both receive a weight of 2 because they partly reinforce
each other's testimony.
7. No set of weights will cause the weighted average to exceed .90 with probabilities of .20 and
.70. Thus, there is no threshold value for either WI or W2.
8. The difficulty of obtaining a set of evidence items that average better than a .90 probability
may indicate that jurors and judges generally operate below the .90 threshold, even though.
judges and commentators say that .90 is roughly the probability translation of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
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question to be answered is whether the prosecution will prove the defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For the sake of simplicity, there are only two items of evidence. The first item is a defense
witness who offers an alibi for the defendant. There is an 80%
probability that the alibi witness is telling the truth, which would obviously favor a not guilty verdict. The second item of evidence is a prosecution witness who claims to have seen the defendant at the scene of
the crime. There is a 70% probability that the prosecution witness is
telling the truth when that witness' testimony is analyzed without considering the testimony of other witnesses.
Not all witnesses or items of evidence have the same importance.
For instance, in the context of the case analyzed in Table 3, an alibi
witness is more important than a witness who saw the defendant at the
scene of the crime. If the alibi witness is telling the truth, then the
defendant cannot be guilty. If, however, the witness who allegedly saw
the defendant at the scene of the crime is telling the truth, then the
defendant could still be innocent of the crime charged, since presence
at the scene of the crime does not necessarily imply that the defendant
committed the crime. Therefore, the alibi statement has been given a
weight of 2, as noted parenthetically in Table 3, column (1).
The synthesizing, then, involves adding .40 and .70 in order to obtain a weighted sum of 1.10 (see column (5)) for the alternative finding
that the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged. Similarly, a
weighted sum of 1.90 is found for the alternative that the defendant is
not guilty. Those two weighted sums should then be divided by the sum
of the weights, which equal three (two for alibi and one for prosecution
witness). The quotient of this division yields .37 and .63 as shown in
column (6). Hence, the synthesized data indicates that there is a .37
probability that the defendant is guilty and a .63 probability that the
defendant is not guilty. 5 Since any criminal conviction must rest upon
evidence that proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is
guilty, it would be appropriate to acquit the defendant because the
probability of guilt should be higher than .90.1

III.

USING

MCDMS

TO PRESCRIBE DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF GOALS
TO BE ACHIEVED

There are two types of prescriptive decisions that lend themselves
to MCDMS analysis. The first type of decision is based upon policy.

15. The following materials set forth a general discussion of systematic synthesizing of facts
in trial decisions: J. FRANK, COURT ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1950);
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (N. Kerr & R. Bray ed. 1982); THE TRIAL PROCESS (B.
Sales ed. 1981).
16. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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Examples of decisions based upon policy would be the constitutionality
of allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted at trial, or perhaps,
the constitutionality of a five-member jury. The second type of decision
are those made at trial. For instance, trial decisions would include the
decision to release a defendant on bail prior to trial, or the decision to
acquit a defendant at the conclusion of the trial.
A.

Policy Decisions

Table 4 provides an example of the use of P/G% software to analyze what policy should be adopted by the court in light of a set of
goals to be achieved. 17 The subject analyzed in Table 4 is how illegally
obtained evidence should be treated by the courts in criminal cases.
There are four alternatives the court could adopt in such a situation.
The court could admit the evidence under the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule or the court could admit the evidence under the
suspension-dismissal exception to the exclusionary rule. Further, the
court could adopt the prevailing rule of excluding evidence seized contrary to the dictates of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution.18 Finally, the court could emphasize the possibility of a
suit for damages by the criminal defendant against the offending police
officer and the possibility of prosecution to deter illegal searches. The
goals to be achieved include decreasing illegal searches, discouraging
false testimony by police officers, and decreasing the crime rate.
The score of each alternative based upon the stated criteria is indicated in Table 4. The alternatives were scored on a 1-3 scale, where 3
represents a relatively high score, 2 is the equivalent of a middling
score, and a 1 represents a relatively low score. When the goal of decreasing illegal police searches is considered, the alternatives of suspensions-dismissals and damages-prosecution are the strongest deterrents if
applied. When the goal of deterring false statements by the police is
considered, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not
score as well as the other alternatives. Reviewing the goal of decreasing
criminal occurrences, the good-faith exception scored the highest, probably because it allows law enforcement authorities the most freedom in
conducting searches and seizing evidence. As to feasibility, the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule may be constitutionally ques-

17. The following sources set forth a general discussion on analyzing some of the various
legal policies adopted by the court system: LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (L. Friedman &
S. Macaulay ed. 1977); S. NAGEL, POLICY EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMUM DECISIONS (1982); S.
NAGEL, RESEARCH ANNUALS IN LAW POLICY STUDIES (1986); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (1977).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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TABLE 4. PRESCRIBING POLICY DECISIONS TO ACHIEVE GOALS: EVIDENCE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED (Y-s)
ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES(X's)

Not
encouraging

Decreasing
Illegal
police soarches
(L)

lying by police occurrence
(N)
(C)

I Allow evidencein when
police testify/illegal behavior
w] nnetonl(egn
-a unintentional
(Reagan)
2. Allow evidencein whenthe
staterule is suspension
on
first
offenseanddismissalon

OVERALL SCORES

Decreasing Feasibility
crime

Liberal Score

Neutral
Conservative Total
Score _
S__ _
_

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

I

3

I

8

II

t0

13

12

15

30

39

3

2

2

I

15

is

14

17

13

16

42

51

2

2

I

3

II

20

10

19

9

18

30

57

3

2

2

I

15

Is

14

17

13

16

42

51

secondoffense (Burger)
3. Encludeillegally sined
evidence(Clark)
4. Emphasine damagesuits
deter illegal scorches
retre )
(Frankfurter)

NOTES:
I. Conservatives would give conservative goals a weight of 3, neutral goals a weight of 2, and
liberal goals a weight of 1.Liberals would give conservative goals a weight of I, neutral goals a
weight of 2, and liberal goals a weight of 3. Neutrals would give all the goals a weight of 2.
2. The scoring of the alternatives on the goals is done on a 1-3 scale. A 3 means conducive to the
goal. A 2 means neither conducive nor adverse to the goal. A I means adverse to the goal.
3. An overall score is calculated by summing the quantities of each relation score for a row multiplied by the weights as described in notes I and 2 above. For example, a liberal would give the
weights of 3, 2, and I respectively to the relation scores in row 1.The overall score then equals:
((lx3) +

(lx2) +

(3xl))

-

3+2+3 = 8.

4. The liberal, neutral, conservative, and total overall scores are shown before (B) and after (A)
adding the feasibility criterion, which has been multiplied by the highest weight. Without the
criterion, the exclusionary rule places third or fourth out of the four alternatives. With the
feasibility criterion, the exclusionary rule comes out first on all four value systems. This assumes feasibility is worth a weight of 3 in view of its importance.
5. The other three alternatives are relatively lacking in feasibility because:
(1)The good faith exception has questionable constitutionality, since it may provide too little
deterence against illegal search and seizure.
(2) A system of suspensions and dismissals would require approval by state legislators or police
administrative boards. Neither source is likely to approve.
(3) Prosecution of police officers for illegal searches without physical violence is unlikely. Likewise, the probabilities of an innocent or guilty person suing for damages, winning, and collecting the judgment are quite low.
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tionable. The suspensions-dismissals alternative lacks legislative feasibility, and the damages-prosecution alternative lacks judicial
feasibility.
If the scores are added across each alternative without giving different weights to the goals, the good-faith exception alternative scored
a 6, whereas the scores of the other three alternatives were equal, with
a score of 8. If different weights for the goals were given in order to
consider the liberal, neutral, and conservative positions, there is still a
three-way tie in scoring among the suspension-dismissal, the exclusionary rule, and the damages-prosecution alternatives. The conclusion to
be drawn from Table 4 is that the exclusionary rule is the most practical of the tied alternatives because it is the only one that passes the
feasibility constraint. The exclusionary rule is feasible because it has
been widely adopted in the United States. The other three alternatives
have not been widely adopted, and there is considerable doubt as to
whether they ever could be.1 9
B.

Trial Decisions

This section is devoted to a discussion of the decisions that should
be reached in important trial matters, such as whether to hold or release a criminal defendant pending trial, or whether to acquit or convict a defendant who has been tried. Table 5 demonstrates how the
P/G % software analyzes the important decision concerning whether to
acquit or convict a criminal defendant. There are two obvious alternatives available to a finder of fact in a criminal case - a vote to acquit
or a vote to convict. There are at least two essential goals in any criminal trial - to acquit the innocent, and to convict the guilty. Although
additional goals are possible, they are not necessary for the example
indicated in Table 5.
The materials in Table 5 assume that the decision-maker is faced
with a criminal defendant who is perceived as having a .70 probability
of guilt, and thus a .30 complementary probability of innocence. Table
5 also assumes that the goal of acquitting the innocent is considered to
be ten times more important than the goal of convicting the guilty
(weighted score). 20 Table 5 could utilize any set of probabilities or
weights.
Given the probabilities chosen for the example in Table 5, voting
to acquit has a .30 probability of achieving the goal of acquitting the

19.
(1961).
20.

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
4 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

358 (1765).
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TABLE 5. PRESCRIBING TRIAL DECISIONS TO ACHIEVE GOALS
CRITERIA

(I)

(2)
(3)
PERCEIVED VALUES
Acquitting
theInnocent
w- 10

ALTERNATIVES

VOTE TO

Scoe

Wtd. Sonr
10 times(1)

(4)

Convicting
theGuilty
w- I
Scor¢

Wtd. Sco
I tines(3)

(5)

WEIGHTED
TOTAL
.(2) + (4)

(6)
(7)
THRESHOLD VALUES
Acquitting
theInnocent

Convicting
theGuilty

W - 2.33

W - I

0

0

.70

.70

.70

0

.91

.30

3.00

0

0

3.00

.09

0

CONVICT
VOTE TO
ACQUIT

NOTES:
I.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Acquitting the innocent is tentatively considered to be 10 times as important as convicting the
guilty in accordance with the value system of William Blackstone.
The above situation is for a hypothetical case in which the defendant is perceived as having a
.70 probability of guilt. Guilt could also be measured on a 0-10, 1-5, or scale other than 0100.
A vote to convict is considered as having no effect on acquitting the innocent, and a vote to
acquit has no effect on convicting the guilty. For a different approach, one could consider
voting to convict as having a -.30 effect on acquitting the innocent, and voting to acquit as
having a -.70 effect on convicting the guilty in this case. Either approach produces identical
results. The approach-shown in Table 5 is, however, the simpler approach.
The threshold weight of 2.33 indicates how low the weight of Goal I to Goal 2 would have to
be in order to have a tie when the probability of guilt is .70.
The threshold probability of .09 and .91 are the probabilities that will result in a tie between
the two alternatives when Goal I is considered 10 times as important as Goal 2.
The threshold values are calculated by using the formula W(I-P) = P, where W is the weight
of Goal I to Goal 2, and P is the probability of guilt.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:2

innocent. On the other hand, a decision to convict the criminal defendant has a .70 probability of realizing the goal of convicting the guilty.
Voting to convict has either zero effect on the desired goal of acquitting
the innocent or a -.30 effect. Similarly, a decision to acquit has either
no effect on convicting the guilty or a -.70 effect. Either interpretation,
however, leads to the same result.
Column (2) of Table 5 indicates that the scores in column (1)
have been multiplied by a weight of 10. Column (4) demonstrates that
the scores in column (3) have been multiplied by a weight of 1. Those
weights or multipliers reflect the 10 to 1 trade-off of the two goals.
When the weighted scores are summed across each alternative, the vote
to convict alternative has a weighted total of .70, and the vote to acquit
alternative has a weighted total of 3. Thus, given the facts presumed in
Table 5, the decision-maker should vote to acquit the defendant in the
hypothetical case, given the probabilities of guilt, the probabilities of
innocence and the relative weights of the two goals.
The threshold values for each probability and each weight are of
special interest. The threshold values are the values that either the
original scores or the original weights would need to be in order for the
second-place alternative to have a score greater than or equal to the
first place alternative. If the probabilities of guilt and innocence were
changed to .91 and .09 respectively, and the weights of each probability
were kept at 1 and 10 respectively, the resulting weighted totals would
each equal .9 when rounded off to one decimal place. Thus, .91 is a
threshold or tie-causing value with weights of 1 and 10. On the other
hand, if the probability of guilt or innocence were maintained at .70
and .30 respectively, and the weights of each probability were 1 and
2.33 respectively, the weighted total for each alternative would equal
.70 when rounded up to one decimal place. Thus, a weight of 2.33 for
avoiding conviction errors is a threshold or tie-causing value with
probabilities of .70 and .30.
These threshold values can be determined by solving the breakeven
equation W(1-P) = P for the desired variable, which is weight (W) or
percentage (P). For example, inserting the guilty percentage of .70 for
P and solving the equation for the unknown variable W, yields a W
threshold value of 2.33, which is the tie-causing weight. Similarly, inserting the innocent weight value of 10 for W and solving the equation
for P, yields a P threshold value of .91. When the compliment of .91,
which is .09, is then inserted for the corresponding percentage, the
weighted totals will be equal when each of these new percentages is
multiplied by the original guilty and innocent weights of 1 and 10 respectively. Thus, if any value between 0 and 1 is inserted, the threshold
weight equation can be solved. Similarly, if any value is inserted for W,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/5
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the equation can be solved.
IV.

1

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

There are many examples that can be utilized in demonstrating
the use of systems analysis to improve judicial administration. Three
instructive examples are the assigning of judges to particular types of
cases, the efficient sequencing of court cases, and the allocation of cases
to alternative methods of dispute resolution.
A.

Assigning Judges to Cases

Table 6 demonstrates a systematic approach for assigning judges
to various types of cases. The hypothetical problem utilized in Table 6
involves two judges, Judge Fox and Judge Wolf. The two types of cases
to be assigned are criminal and civil cases. Further, each judge in the
hypothetical situation is expected to spend an average of ten hours a
week on the bench. In any given week, there are approximately eight
hours of criminal trial time and twelve hours of civil trial time necessary to keep the court's docket up to date.
Judge Fox received a quality score of 4 for criminal trial cases on
a 1-5 scale, and Judge Wolf was given a quality score of 2 for criminal
trials. Each judge was assigned a quality score of 3 for civil trials. The
scores were provided by having each judge or lawyer in the system
anonymously score each other, which presumes there are more than
two judges available in this jurisdiction. Further, each judge also scored
himself on the category pertaining to his degree of interest in the case
types. The ability and interest scores were averaged to produce the
aforementioned quality scores. The next inquiry, then, is to determine
the most appropriate allocation of Judges Fox and Wolf to the two
types of cases.
The most appropriate allocation, in this context, is an assignment
that would result in as high an overall score in quality as possible
within the row and column constraints. The overall quality score is the
summation of the products calculated by multiplying each judge's quality score times the hours assigned for a given case type. In this context,
the equation for the overall quality score is 4a+2c+3b+3d. The object is to solve for variables a, b, c, and so as to maximize the overall
score and to satisfy the stated constraints.
The most appropriate method of proceeding if the attorney does
21. For literature on prescribing trial decisions or decision-making processes in light of the
goals to be achieved, see K. BOTTOMLY, DECISIONS IN THE PENAL PROCESS (1973); M. GOTTFREDSON & D. GOTTFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (1980); S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1979). by eCommons, 1988
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TABLE 6. ASSIGNING JUDGES TO CASETYPES
CASES
JUDGE
FOX
WOLF
Hours per
Casetype

CRIMINAL
Quality
Hours
Score
Assigned
4
a
2
c
8

CIVIL
Quality
Score
3
3

Hours
Assigned
b
d

Hours per
Judge
10
10

12

20

NOTES:
1. The allocation system is shown in its simplest form with two judges and two case-types. Each
judge is expected to put in ten hours a week to satisfy the average weekly total of 20 hours of
trial time. Criminal cases constitute 40% of the total, or 8 hours, and civil cases constitute
60% of the total, or 12 hours. Judge I receives scores of 4 and 3 on the two case-types, and
Judge 2 receives scores of 2 and 3.
2.

A logical way to resolve the optimum allocation with this relatively simple example is to
reason as follows:
(1) Judge Wolf does a bad job on criminal cases. Therefore, give Judge Wolf 0 criminal
hours. That means Judge Wolf gets 10 civil hours to add across to 10. Judge Fox must
then get 8 criminal hours to add down to 8. Judge Fox must also get 2 civil hours in
order to add across to 10 and down to 12.
(2) Judge Fox does a good job on criminal cases. Therefore, give Judge Fox as many hours
as possible on criminal cases, which is 8. That means Judge Wolf gets 0 criminal hours
to add down to 8. Judge Wolf must then get 10 civil hours to add across to 10. Judge
Fox must also get 2 civil hours to add across to 10 and down to 12.

3. On a more general level, resolve the optimum allocation by reasoning as follows:
(1) Pick out all the quality scores that are l's or 2's. Give those cells as few hours as possible.
(2) Pick out all the quality scores that are 5's or 4's. Give those cells as many hours as
possible.
(3) Make logical adjustments so that all the columns add down to fulfill the hours required
per case-type, and all the rows add across to fulfill the required hours per judge.
(4) Also try to minimize the number of case-types per judge, rather than have every judge
handle every case-type
4.

The optimum allocation is defined as allocating the total number of hours to each cell so as to
satisfy the row constraints, the column constraints, and any cell constraints, while at the same
time maximizing the sum of the products of the quality score multiplied by the hours assigned
for each cell. A cell includes a quality score of a judge on a case-type and a quantity of hours
assigned to a judge on a case-type.
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not have a computer is to assign as few hours as possible to those cells
which have quality scores of 1 or 2. Conversely, as many hours as possible should be assigned to those cells that have quality scores of 4 or 5,.
while satisfying the constraints. In so doing, there is resulting allocation
of 0 hours to c, 8 hours to a, 2 hours to b, and 10 hours to d in the
example.
The method of allocation described above can be meaningful when
applied to both a substantial number of judges and cases. However,
assignment problems involving a large number of judges and types of
cases can be solved faster and with more efficiency by using a linear
programming routine. The use of such a routine on a microcomputer is
quite simple. The only information required to be input into the computer are the row totals, the column totals, and the quality scores. The
computer then generates the optimum allocations. The program will
also indicate how much each quality score can vary without affecting
the optimum result, how much each row and column total can vary,
and how much of a change in the overall quality score would occur as a
result of a change in the other data.2"
B.

Sequencing of Court Cases

Table 7 indicates that substantial time savings per case can be
achieved by hearing the case that is anticipated to take the least
amount of the court's time first and hearing the case that is anticipated
to take the greatest amount of the court's time last. The cases utilized
in Table 7 are predicted to take 20, 10, and 5 days of trial time,
respectively.
If the cases are heard in the order shown in row 2, several scenarios would result. There will be no delay for the first case, which, of
course, is true for all first cases on the court's docket. The second case
would be delayed by twenty days while waiting for the first case to be
completed. Finally, the third case could be faced with a thirty day delay before going to trial because the first two trials took a total of thirty

22. For materials discussing the assignment of judges to case-types, see ABA COMMISSION
ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS 86-93 (1976); TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS

88-90, 165-67 (1967). For general literature on assigning people to tasks, see W. ERIKSON & 0.
HALL. COMPUTER MODELS FOR MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (1983). For information on assigning
lawyers to case-types, see Nagel & Mills, Using Management Science to Assign Lawyers to Types of
Cases, 15 CAP.
U.L. REv. 2231988
Published
by eCommons,
(1986).
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T4BLE 7. SEQUENCING COURT CASES: THE TIME CRITERIA
CRITERIA
ALTERNATIVE
SEQUENCES

(1)
Waiting Time
for
1st Case

(2)
Waiting Time
for
2nd Case

(3)
Waiting Time
for
3rd Case

(4)
Total
Processing
Time

(5)
Total
Time
(1+2+3+4)

(6)
Average
Total Time
(5)/3

1) 20, 10, 5

0

20

30

35

85

28

2) 20,5. 10

0

20

25

35

80

27

3) 10. 20, 5

0

10

30

35

75

25

4) 5.20, 10

0

5

25

35

65

22

5) 10,5. 20

0

10

15

35

60

20

6) 5, 10, 20

0

5

15

35

55

18

Totals

0

70

140

210

420

140

Average/6

0

12

23

35

70

23

1. There are three cases. They are predicted to consume in trial 20 days, 10 days, and 5 days

respectively. The problem is determining the optimum order in which to sequence the cases.
There are six possible orders or sequence patterns for the three cases. For the sake of simplicity the analysis assumes only one judge or one processor.
2. The waiting time for any case is the sum of the processing times or trial times of the prior
cases. The total processing time is always the sum of the separate trial times regardless of the
order in which the cases occur. The overall total time is the sum of the %waitingtimes and the
processing times.
3. Taking the shortest cases first minimizes the average total time. Taking the longest cases first
maximizes the average total time.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/5
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TABLE 7B. SEQUENCING COURT CASES: THE EQUITY CRITERIA

CRITERIA

(7)
Sum of
Gains

(8)
Sum of
Losses

(9)
Net
Gains

ALTERNATIVE

(10)
Maximum
Waiting
Time

(II)
Maximum
Total
Time

SEQUENCES
1) 20, 10,5

0

0

0

30

35

2) 20, 5, 10

10

-5

5

25

35

3) 10,20,5

20

-10

10

30

35

4) 5,20, 10

30

-10

20

25

35

5) 10, 5,20

40

-15

25

15

35

6) 5, 10,20

45

-I5

30

15

35

Totals

145

-55

90

104

210

-9

15

23

35

Average/6

24

NOTES:
4. Equity is generally considered d constraint that is either fulfilled or not fulfilled. This is unlike
the average total time which is a variable goal to be minimized.
5. The utilitarian measure of equity is whether the greatest good for the greatest number has
been promoted. That means whether the sum of the gains outweighs the sum of the losses.
This test is fulfilled by improving the situation when the longest cases are first. The most
improvement is realized when the shortest cases are first.
6. The Pareto measure of equity is whether those who have losses could be compensated by those
who have gains. This test is fulfilled here since the losers could be compensated for their
losses, and the gainers would still come out ahead. This is especially so if one considers that
the losers are the longer cases that are making extra use of tax-supported facilities.
7. The Rawlsian measure of equity is that no case should suffer more than a maximum waiting
time. If the maximum waiting time is 60 days, then the equity criterion is fulfilled. Notice
that with alternative 6, the average time per case is substantially reduced as well as the maximum waiting time. Thus, this alternative gives both increased efficiency and increased equity.
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days. The total processing time or trial time for all three of the hypothetical cases is thirty-five days, which is obviously the sum of their
separate trial times. If fifty days waiting time is added (column (2)
plus column (3)) to the thirty-five days processing time (column (4)),
there is a total time across the three cases of eighty-five days. Therefore, an average of twenty-eight days per case results.
If the cases are heard such that the shortest cases are heard first
(indicated in row 6), there will be a resulting five day waiting time for
the second case and only a fifteen day delay for the third case. Therefore, only twenty days of waiting time is added to the thirty-five day
processing time, which results in an overall time total of fifty-five days.
If the fifty-five days is divided by the three hypothetical cases, an average of eighteen days per case results. A time savings of ten days per
case is achieved by switching the cases on the docket so that the shortest case is heard first.
The fairness or equity of such a scheduling system might be questioned. Table 7B indicates how much time each case has gained or lost
as a result of altering the docketing system. The table shows the total
days gained (column (7)) or the total days lost (column (8)) as a result
of rearranging the sequence of cases as initially set out in alternative 1.
The net gains are then figured (column (9)) by adding the values in
columns (7) and (8).
In row 6, for example, the sum of gains obtained by switching
from alternative 1 to alternative 6 is forty-five days. Those forty-five
days reflect the fact that the case expected to take five days has gained
thirty-days (compare Table 7 - row 1, column (3) with row 6, column
(1)), and the case expected to last for ten days has gained fifteen days.
The data available in row 6 also indicates that the case scheduled for
twenty days has lost fifteen days by being scheduled after the first two
cases. The net gain of thirty days (45-15) demonstrates that the system
does satisfy the utilitarian criterion of fairness by promoting the greatest gain in days for the greatest number of cases.
It is important in discussing the equity of optimum sequencing to
consider that the cases which gained time could compensate the cases
which lost time. If alternative 1 and alternative 6 are used as an example, analysis of Table 7B indicates how monetary compensation could
be afforded the case that was forced to lose time, if one day lost is
worth one monetary unit. Assuming, for example, the five day case and
ten day case, which gained 45 days together could collectively give the
20 days case, which lost 15 days, fifteen monetary units for the lost
days. This compensation, however, would still be thirty monetary units
ahead between the two cases that gained time. Consequently, the case
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/5
that lost time would be compensated and the two cases that gained
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time would not suffer any negative impact due to their contribution.
It has been proposed that such compensation could be accomplished through differential filing fees. Such a system, however, would
seem to be unnecessary because the case that lost time has been compensated by having control over the courtroom for a greater period of
time at the taxpayer's expense. More importantly, the system of sequencing could specify that no case would be required to wait for more
than thirty or sixty days. If a case is approaching the maximum period
of delay time, it could then be resequenced and moved to the top of the
court's docket. The cases could also be grouped for docketing every one
or two weeks so that the longest case in any time period would go
ahead of the shortest case in the subsequent time period."
It must be noted that all the alternative sequences are equal in
terms of the cost of judges and court personnel, in permitting each set
of litigants access to the courtroom, and in preventing the need to reduce the trial time for any case. It has also been found helpful to predict trial time from knowledge of the subject matter of the cases. Optimum sequencing, moreover, is politically feasible because there does
not appear to be any constitutional problems or cost prohibitive consequences of the process.
C. Allocating Cases to Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution
Table 8A demonstrates how the P/G% software can be useful in
an allocation-type problem in which the bottom line consists of allocation percentages. The hypothetical problem utilized here concerns allocating criminal cases to alternative methods of resolving them.
The two alternatives available in the hypothetical cases are trials
and plea bargains. Additional alternatives, such as diversion programs
and dismissals, could also be considered. The goals utilized in the problem consist of a desire to reduce delay in the resolution of cases and a
desire to promote respect for the legal system. Additional goals, such as
reducing expenses and increasing the probability that innocent persons
are acquitted, could also be factored into the problem.
The raw data in Table 8A hypothetically indicates that the average length of time between arrest and completion of the criminal trial

23.

For materials discussing efficient docketing and sequencing of court cases, see M. SOLO-

MON, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT (1973); Nagel, Beeman & Reed, Optimum
Sequencing of Court Cases to Reduce Delay, ALA. L. REV. 583 (1986). For more general literature on by
efficient
sequencing,
see R. CONWAY, THEORY OF SCHEDULING (1967).
Published
eCommons,
1988
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TABLE 8. ALLOCATING CASES TO METHODS OF RESOLVING: THE BASIC DATA
A.

RAW DATA
Delay
(Days)

Respect
(0-10 Scale)

Trials

120

6

Pleas

30

2

150

8

B. TRANSFORMED RAW DATA
Speed
(I/Days)

Respect
(-5 to +5)

Trials

1/120
or .00833

+I

Pleas

1/30
or .03333

-3

5/120
or .04166

-2

C.

PART/WHOLE PERCENTAGES

Speed
P/W%

Respect
P/W

Aggregate
P/W%

Allocation %

Trials

20%

100%

120%

60%

Pleas

80%

0%

80%

40%

100%

100%

200%

100%

D.

WEIGHTED P/W%'s

Speed
w=l

Respect
w=2

Aggregate
P/W%

Allocation %

Trials

20%

200%

220%

73%

Pleas

80%

0%

80%

27%

Total

100%

200%

300%

100%
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NOTES:
I.

The raw data is hypothetical, but realistic. The object is to decide on the optimum allocation
of cases suited for trials and cases suited for pleas in light of the facts that:
(1) Trials receive a 120 day delay score and pleas receive a 30 day delay score.
(2) Trials receive a score of 6 on the respect scale and pleas receive a score of 2 on the same
scale.

2. Transforming the raw data involves:
(I) Calculate the reciprocals for the raw scores of the negative goal of delay.
(2) Re-calculate the raw scores on respect using a scale which shows absolute zero. If N
equals absolute zero, then subtract N from each of the original raw scores. For example,
on a 0-10 scale, the number 5 (or below) might be absolute zero.
3. Calculating the correct part/whole percentages involves:
(1) Calculate the part/whole percentages on the inverted negative goal of delay.
(2) Give zero percent to any alternative that has a negative raw score. Then calculate the
part/whole percentages for the other alternatives.
4.

Calculating the allocation percentages involves:
(1) Multiply the part/whole percentages in each column by the relative weight given to the
column.
(2) Sum the weighted part/whole percentages across each alternative.
(3) Divide those aggregate percentages by the sum of the weights. The results are the allocation percentages for each alternative or budget category.
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is 120 days, while the average plea bargain takes 30 days from date of
arrest to final disposition. The data also shows that the alternative of
proceeding to trial receives a respect score of 6 on a 0-10 scale in a
rough survey of attorneys. In addition, the alternative of plea bargaining receives a survey score of 2.
Since the delay and respect values are in different units, days and
numerical scale, a common measure is needed in order to be in a position to add the two scores. In order to alleviate this problem, several
things must be done.
The delay scores must be converted into part/whole percentages.
The first step in this process is to calculate the reciprocals of each delay
score. Thus, for trial delay, the reciprocal of 120 would equal 1/120,
which has the decimal equivalent of .00833. This number is then divided by the sum of the delay (.00833/.04166). The quotient of this
calculation is the part/whole percentage for trial delay which, in this
example, equals 20%. These same calculations would next be run for
the plea delay. Inverting the scores representing the negative goal of
delay enables the trial score to remain four times as long, or as bad, as
the plea score, while simultaneously making the plea score numerically
higher than the trial score. Consequently, the resulting part/whole percentages can thus be viewed in terms of speed, rather than delay.
The respect scores must now be converted into part/whole percentages. First, the scores in the respect category must be adjusted to indicate where they would be located on a scale reflecting absolute zero for
the given range of numbers. For example, on a scale from 1 to 10,
absolute zero would be 5. In other words, the middle number on the
scale becomes zero and the other numbers on the scale adjust accordingly. Therefore, in our example, 1 would equal negative 5, 5 would
equal zero, and 10 would equal positive 5. The respect scores are set to
the absolute zero scale by subtracting the absolute zero number from
the original score. In this example, 6 becomes + 1 and 2 becomes -2.
The transferred raw scores must now be converted into part/whole percentages. Only the minimum possible percentage should be attributed
to the alternative with a negative score; pleas would be given a part/
whole percentage of 0%. The trials percentage then must be made to
equal 100%, since the sum of percentages must equal 100%.
Once the part/whole percentages are calculated, the aggregate
part/whole percentages may be calculated by summing the speed and
respect scores laterally for each alternative, trials and pleas. The aggregate part/whole percentages are then divided by two, since greater
than 100% cannot be allocated. The resulting quotient is labeled the
allocation percentage. Hence, the analysis indicates that given the dehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/5
lay and respect values as listed in Table 8A, 60% of criminal cases
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should be resolved by plea bargains.
The above analysis can be taken one step further. As shown in
Table 8D, the speed and respect factors may be weighted with respect
to their perceived importance. Table 8D takes into consideration that
the goal of increasing respect for the judicial system is considered to be
twice as important as the goal of reducing delays in dispensing with
cases. Therefore, the percentages in the respect column must be multiplied by 2. The new aggregate percentages are 220% and 80%. The
percentage is then divided by 3, which is the sum of the weights. Consequently, when respect is weighted two times as important as speed,
73% of the criminal cases would be resolved by trials and 27% of
criminal cases would be resolved by plea bargain.
Not all allocation problems involve multiple dimensions, negative
goals, or negative scores. If, however, one can follow the allocation
analysis in Table 8, then simpler allocation situations will not be
24
problematic.
IV.

COMPUTER-AIDED MEDIATION

Adjudication seeks to determine which party has the strongest legal position between the plaintiff and the defendant. By necessity, then,
there must be a "winner" and a "loser" in adjudications. Mediation, on
the other hand, seeks to resolve the dispute by means of a settlement in
which both parties feel they have won, at least in the sense of coming
out of the dispute in a better position than they might have expected if
the case had gone to trial, or some other non-settlement means of dispute resolution.
Mediation can be aided by computers, especially with spreadsheet
software. This software permits each side in the dispute to compare
more systematically the benefits and costs of settling the dispute, as
opposed to proceeding to trial or resorting to another non-settlement
approach .25
V.

CONCLUSION

Multi-criteria decision-making models offer a wide variety of benefits to the judicial process. The models encourage those involved in judicial decision-making to be more explicit in defining the goals to be
achieved by a particular decision, the alternatives for achieving the
goals, and the relationships between the goals and the alternatives. The

24. For information on allocating cases, money, or other resources to activities or places, see
S. Nagel, EVALUATION ANALYSIS WITH MICROCOMPUTERS (1989).
25. For further details on computer-aided dispute resolution, see S. NAGEL, MULTI-CRITERIA METHODS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1990); S. Nagel, Microcomputers, Dispute Resolution.
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models also assist decision-makers in choosing the alternative, or combination of alternatives, that is most beneficial. Further, MCDMS
models can lead to more predictive decisional rules and thus help to
eliminate inconsistent precedents.
But perhaps most important, in terms of forming judicial decisions, the models encourage the users to inject their knowledge and expertise into the problem. In addition, the models stimulate new insights
into causal and normative relations that might otherwise be overlooked
by the decision-maker. Finally, MCDMS models can be used by the
average practitioner in order to simplify arithmetic, record-keeping,
and manipulation of data.
There are few costs involved in obtaining the benefits available
from MCDMS. A user need only have a willingness to think differently
and more explicitly about the judicial process. The benefits of using the
models clearly outweigh the costs, particularly if the models are used as
supplements, rather than substitutes, to traditional perspectives. 6

26. The ideas from this article are currently being presented or scheduled for presentation
at special judicial training seminars sponsored by the Committee for Continuing Professional Education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, the ABA Committee on
Appellate Staff Attorneys, and possibly the ABA Judicial Administration Division, the National
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/5
Judicial College, and the National Center for State Courts.

